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Introduction

A stark circuit split mars the consistency of trademark
infringement analyses within U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.' Every
circuit engages in a fact-based analysis at the district court level to
establish the requisite for a claim of trademark infringement* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2006; B.A.
University of California, Los Angeles, 2003. The author would like to include the
following dedication:
"...all experience is an arch wherethrough/Gleams that untravelled world whose
margin fades/For ever and ever when I move." - Tennyson, "Ulysses"
For my parents, who opened my eyes to the immensity of the world and taught
me that there is always something more to learn.
1. See Infra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
109
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likelihood of confusion.2 No circuit requires that precisely the same
factors be analyzed in every trademark infringement case;3 courts
must instead determine which factors from the non-exhaustive list in
that circuit are relevant.'
Disparity between standards of review on appeal from trial
decisions places appellants at a stark disadvantage in some circuits
and unnecessarily hinders the function of appellate courts by
constraining their review of a substantially subjective balancing of
facts Development of standards of review across the various and
diverse circuits has been scattershot. Some circuits have remained
constant in approach since their initial articulation of the appropriate
standard of review,6 while others have seen dramatic shifts from de
novo review to clearly erroneous review.' The Second and Ninth
Circuits, as exemplars of circuits employing de novo and essentially
clearly erroneous review8 respectively, will be the focal points of the
discussion of trademark infringement tests for comparative purposes.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari to resolve this issue over
the objection of Justice White in 1982, 9 but it is increasingly apparent
that the circuits are settling comfortably into their divergent
standards of review. Justice White wrote similar dissents to denials of
certiorari after 1982, and has repeatedly stated that the Supreme
Court should grant a hearing on whether likelihood of confusion is
reviewable by an appellate court as a question of fact or a conclusion
of law. 01f, like underlying factual inquiries, likelihood of confusion is
2. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961)
(establishing a test similar to that employed in every circuit).
3. All circuits follow the basic Polaroidanalysis with only slight variations. See, e.g.,
Falcon Rice Mill Inc. v. Cmty. Rice Mill, Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 345 (5th Cir. 1984) (analyzing
identity of retail outlets, purchasers, and advertising media); Piper Aircraft Corp. v. WagAero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 934 (7th Cir. 1984) (rephrasing Polaroidfactors). Not all of the
factors need be considered, and some circuits hold a single factor to be dispositive. Kellog
Co. v. Pack'em Enters., 951 F.2d 330, 332 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
4. Kellog, 951 F.2d at 332.
5. See infra Part Ill.
6. The Second Circuit, for example, has employed the same standard of review since
Plus Products v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1983).
7. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
8. "Essentially" clearly erroneous review because likelihood of confusion is still
called a mixed question of law and fact, but appellate courts are instructed to uphold the
decision of the district court in cases where facts are in dispute in absence of clear error,
despite the fact that the conclusion of law does not flow directly from the facts, but from a
subjective balancing thereof.
9. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc. v. Frisch's Rests., Inc., 459 U.S. 916, 916
(1982).
10. Id.
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a question of fact, appellate courts would review it under a clearly
erroneous standard; if it is a conclusion of law, a de novo standard
would apply. As the body of case law solidifying the propriety of de
novo review in some circuits and clearly erroneous review in others
develops, it becomes more apparent that the Supreme Court will have
to address the disparate treatment among the circuits.
De novo review is the appropriate standard of review for
determinations of likelihood of confusion for several reasons.
Jurisdictions requiring appellate courts to evaluate likelihood of
confusion as if it were a question of fact ignore the subjective nature
of the balancing test." Likelihood of confusion requires findings of
fact on relevant underlying issues, but these factual findings must be
weighed against each
other by a judge before likelihood of confusion
12
can be established.
Since the facts underpinning the district court's decision are laid
out in the opinion of every trademark infringement case, the multifactor balancing approach required to answer the legal question of
likelihood of confusion is structurally ideal for appellate review."
Precisely because each district court must so painstakingly and
explicitly explain its rationale, the appellate court is situated perfectly
to reevaluate the subjective determination made by the district court
to ensure proper application of law.
II. Establishing Trademark Infringement
"The function of a [trade]mark is to identify and distinguish the
goods or services of one seller from those sold by all others.""4 At
common law, trademark infringement analysis begins with a
preliminary determination of whether the products using the
trademark were in direct competition. 5 The original trademark
infringement test for competing goods was whether the marks were
confusingly similar. 16 Case law in many circuits, including the Second
and Ninth, abrogates the need for the initial common law inquiry. In
such circuits, the non-competing good analysis applies to all
infringement cases, whether or not the products compete. 7 This
11.
12.

See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
Supra note 3.

13.

Infra Part IV.B.

14. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
COMPETITION, §§ 12:1, 12-4 (4th ed.

2 MCCARTHY
2004).

ON TRADEMARKS

AND

UNFAIR

15.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 (1995).

16.
17.

Id.
See, e.g., Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1985); J.B.
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discussion focuses on the appellate standard of review for trademark
infringement in circuits applying the same analysis to competing and
non-competing products and, where the circuit employs different
analyses for competing and non-competing products, those cases
involving non-competing products.
At present, trademark infringement analysis in this context
focuses on the perspective of the potential or real consumer.
Common law, most state statutes, and the Lanham Act use likelihood
of confusion as the standard for trademark infringement.' 8
Infringement exists when an "appreciable number of ordinary
prudent purchasers will be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to
the source of the goods in question."' 9 Since infringement focuses on
the probability that consumers will be confused, plaintiffs are not
required to demonstrate that consumers are actually confused, only
that people are likely to be confused.0
A. Likelihood of Confusion in The Second Circuit
The seminal case on trademark infringement in the Second
Circuit is Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.2 Under
Polaroid, likelihood of consumer confusion is based on eight nonexclusive factors2 : (1) strength of the mark, (2) degree of similarity
between the marks, (3) proximity of the products, (4) likelihood of
direct future competition, (5) actual confusion, (6) reciprocal of the
defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark, (7) the quality of the
23
subsequent user's product, and (8) the sophistication of consumers.
The Second Circuit does not apply every factor to each case of
alleged infringement.24 Since establishing the Polaroid test, the
Second Circuit has explained that the Polaroid factors are nonexclusive and "should not be applied 'mechanically.' 25 No single factor
is dispositive, and cases may certainly arise where a factor is
irrelevant to the facts at hand."26 A district court judge must, however,
Williams Co. v. Le Conte Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187, 192 (9th Cir. 1975).
18.

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF

UNFAIR

COMPETITION

§

21;

15

U.S.C.

§ 1125(a)(1)(A) (2004).
19. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121,127 (4th Cir. 1990).
20. See, e.g. Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988).
21. 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
22. The eight factors for analyzing likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement
cases will hereinafter be referred to as the "Polaroidfactors."
23. 287 F.2d 492, 495.
24. Arrow Fastener Co. v. The Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 400. (2d Cir. 1995).
25. Id.
26. Id.; See also Orient Express Trading Co., Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 842
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deliberately review each factor and explain why a factor is
inapplicable, if that is the case. 7
In Polaroid, the Polaroid Corporation ("Polaroid") brought an
unfair competition action alleging trademark infringement against
Polarad Electronics Corporation ("Polarad").28 Polaroid is a maker of
photographic and optical equipment, and Polarad produces
components for and products associated with televisions. 9 The district
court held that there was no likelihood of confusion in this case,
resting its decision largely on the fact that the two companies were
not in the same markets, and were not, as such, likely to be confused
for one another. 0 This holding was upheld by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.' The significance of Polaroidis not found in its
holding, but rather in the list of the factors it lays out as germane to
likelihood of confusion for the purpose of finding trademark
infringement.
B.

Review of Likelihood of Confusion in the Second Circuit

The Second Circuit deals with likelihood of confusion as a mixed
question of law and fact.32 District courts review each of the Polaroid
factors, which are factual inquiries, under a clearly erroneous
standard.33 In this aspect of the analysis, the approach of the Second
Circuit is substantially similar to that employed by the Ninth Circuit.
Both circuits apply a clearly erroneous standard to review of the facts
underlying the determination of likelihood of confusion. 4
The difference in approaches between the circuits becomes
apparent once the appellate court reaches the ultimate issue of
likelihood of confusion. 5 The approach of the Second Circuit affords
wide latitude to appellate judges in determining the weight
appropriately afforded to each of the district court's findings of
underlying fact.36 It is clear that in the Second Circuit, the Court of
F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that district courts do not have to "slavishly recite the
litany of all eight Polaroid factors in each and every case").
27. Id.
28. Polaroid,287 F.2d 492, 493.
29. Id. at 494-95.
30. Polaroid v. Polarad, 182 F. Supp. 350, 356 (E.D.N.Y., 1960).
31. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 350 (9th Cir. 1979).
32. Plus Products,722 F.2d at 1004.
33. Id.
34. Compare J.B. Williams Co., Inc. v. Le Conte Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187 (9th
Cir. 1975) and Plus Products, 722 F.2d at 999.
35. Infra p. 114.
36. Plus Products,722 F.2d at 1004-05.
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Appeals has plenary power to review
"the relative weight given to
37
each of [the district court's] findings.
Plus Products v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc. effectively illuminates
the approach to likelihood of confusion review employed by appellate
courts in the Second Circuit. 38 At the district court level, Plus
Products ("Products"), as the senior user of the "Plus" mark,
successfully enjoined Plus Discount Foods, Inc. ("Discount Foods")
from using the word "plus" on its stores and products unless the word
"foods" was added to the logo in the same size and style. 9 Products
was a company in the business of selling high quality vitamins and
minerals, skin creams and other beauty products, spices and cooking
oils at a premium price. ' Discount Foods was a chain of "bargain
basement" grocery stores that originated in Germany and sold its own
and other brand products." Discount Foods' product packaging was
labeled with the word "PLUS" surrounded by a blue and orange
border and labeled with the word.42 Products' logo consisted of the
word "PLUS" in block letters,43and contained a plus symbol over a red
dot inside the loop of the "P.
As in all infringement cases, the appellate court recognized -that
"the crucial issue [was] 'whether there [was] any likelihood that an
appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be
misled, or indeed simply confused as to the source of the goods."'" To
determine whether there was a likelihood of confusion, the district
court made a determination on the issue of likelihood of confusion by
analyzing and weighing the Polaroidfactors. 45 The district court also
"comprehensively set out and scrutinized each of the Polaroid
factors," none of which were found to be clearly erroneous on
appeal. ' The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit still reversed
the decision of the district court in part because it disagreed with the
weight accorded several factors, and remanded the case to the lower
court for entry of judgment and modification of the injunction
previously issued.47
37.

Id.

38. See generally id.
39. Id. at 1001.
40. Id. at 1002.
41.
42.
43.

Plus Products, 722 F.2d at 1003.
Id.

45.

Id. at 1004.

46.
47.

Id. at 1005.
Plus Products, 722 F.2d at 1009.

Id.
44. Id.
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Appellate courts in the Second Circuit have free reign to
reevaluate the legal conclusions of the district courts with respect to
likelihood of confusion.48 This authority to review the conclusion of
law that is dispositive on the issue of trademark infringement exists
completely divorced from any requirement that the parties stipulate
to the facts of the case. Plus Products v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc. 49 is
a clear example of the markedly different approach taken by the
Second Circuit as compared to the Ninth in appellate review of the
likelihood of confusion.
C.

Likelihood of Confusion in the Ninth Circuit

Consistent with likelihood of confusion analysis nationwide, the
Ninth Circuit employs a multi-factor balancing test for determining
whether there is a likelihood of confusion between the uses of two
marks." The preeminent Ninth Circuit authority for factors
considered in likelihood of confusion analyses is AMF, Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats. 1 Consistent with the opinion in that case, Ninth
Circuit courts consider the following factors to assess likelihood of
confusion: (1) the strength of the mark, (2) the similarity of the
marks, (3) the marketing channels employed by the parties, (4) the
proximity the goods in the marketplace, (5) the type of goods and the
likely degree of scrutiny that a reasonable consumer would apply to
determining the product's source, (6) intent in selecting the mark, (7)
actual confusion, and (8) the probability the trademark owner will
expand into the new user's market.52
In Sleekcraft, both the AMF, Inc. ("AMF") and Sleekcraft Boats
("Sleekcraft") manufactured boats for recreational use. 3 AMF sued
Sleekcraft alleging trademark infringement of its "Slickcraft" line of
boats, and argued that consumer confusion was likely because of the
extreme similarity of the two producers' trade names.54 Sleekcraft
argued that it was unaware of the "Slickcraft" line of boats when it
established its own separate, but similar, name. 5 The trial court held
that consumer confusion was unlikely. 6 On appeal, the court re48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 1004.
Id.
Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348-49.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 345.
Id.
Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 345.
ld. at 348.
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assessed the likelihood of confusion factors and found that
"Sleekcraft" and "Slickcraft" were likely to cause consumer confusion
because they were so similar. 7 Sleekcraft was required to place its
own unique logo on all marketing and promotional materials to
obfuscate consumer confusion. 8
D. Review of Likelihood of Confusion in the Ninth Circuit
The standard of review for likelihood of confusion in the Ninth
Circuit was in a state of flux for years. 9 Courts waffled between de
novo-like review and a clearly erroneous standard. 60 In 1975, the
Second Circuit finally reached a semblance of consistency. The61
opinion in J. B. Williams Co., Inc. v. Le Conte Cosmetics, Inc.
established a dichotomous test for likelihood of confusion review that
hinges on whether the facts are stipulated at trial.62 Sleekcraft is the
widely-cited opinion that established the Williams test as the
definitive standard for the Ninth Circuit.
Since Williams and Sleekcraft, the Ninth Circuit has reviewed
likelihood of confusion essentially as a question of fact unless the
facts are stipulated at trial.63 The precise Standard articulated in the
Sleekcraft case is as follows: "To the extent that the conclusion of the
trial court is based solely upon disputed findings of fact, the appellate
court must follow the conclusion of the trial court unless it finds the
underlying facts to be clearly erroneous." 6' This line of reasoning in
the Ninth Circuit attempts to draw a parallel between review of a
conclusion of law based on facts and reviewing the underlying facts
themselves. The problem with this parallelism, as will be discussed
later at length, 6 is that likelihood of confusion does not flow directly
from factual findings, but from a balancing thereof.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 354.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 347 (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:23 (1973)) ("Even within some of the circuits, no consistency
is observed, with the court switching from one test to the other, apparently depending
upon the court's initial proclivity to reverse or affirm").
60. Id. at 347 n.12 ("Compare: Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
314 F.2d 149 (1963) (Court of Appeals can reweigh decision on confusion) with Norm
Thompson Outfitters, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 448 F.2d 1293 (1971) (Court of
Appeals must adhere to clearly erroneous rule).").
61. 523 F.2d 187 (asserting that the court reviews likelihood of confusion as a
question of law de novo in cases where the facts are stipulated.)
62. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 347.
63. Id.; Williams, 523 F.2d at 187
64. Alpha, 616 F.2d at 443.
65. See infra Part IV.A.
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Even within the Ninth Circuit, application of the
Williams/Sleekcraft standard has not been wholly consistent since its
formulation. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has, in some
cases, seen fit to review the weight afforded to individual factors in
the likelihood of confusion analysis despite the fact that the case on
appeal disputed only factual findings. In 1980, the court reviewing
likelihood of confusion in Alpha Industries v. Alpha Steel Tubes &
Shapes, Inc. decided to review the issue of likelihood of confusion de
novo.6 6 The appellant sought to have Alpha Steel enjoined from using
"Alpha Steel" as a trade name, arguing that the use of the term
"Alpha," even in conjunction with "Steel Tubes & Shapes," was
confusingly similar to the plaintiff's trademarked "Alpha" brand.67
Alpha, Inc. lost its case at the district court level and challenged only
the factual findings of the court below in its appeal. 6 The circuit court
reviewed the district court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous
standard and the question of likelihood of confusion de novo as a
question of law.6 9 It is irrelevant that the appellate court upheld the
ruling of the district court.70 The primary significance of the Alpha
Industries case is clear: under the Sleekcraft and Williams decisions,
ostensibly the court should never have reached the issue of likelihood
of confusion. The supposed rule in the Ninth Circuit is that unless an
appellate court finds underlying facts in a case clearly erroneous, it
must follow the decision of the district court." Here, the court on
appeal reached the issue of likelihood of confusion despite the fact
that it found no error in the findings of the district court.72
73 decision highlights the fundamental
The Alpha Industries
uncertainty surrounding the Ninth Circuit's "bright line" rule for
review of likelihood of confusion. The words of the Williams standard
of review are confusing in their own right: "[w]hether likelihood of
confusion is more a question of law or one of fact depends on the
circumstances of each particular case., 74 Articulating the Ninth
Circuit's standard of review in this way is either misleading, or the

66,
67.
68.
69.

Alpha, 616 F.2d at 444.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 443.

70.
71.

Id.
Alpha, 616 F.2d at 443.

72.
73.
74.

Id. at 446.
See generally id.
Williams, 523 F.2d at 190.
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proposition Williams stands for has been misapplied.75 Under
Williams, likelihood of confusion is always a question of law reviewed
de novo. Insofar as a case on appeal involves only factual disputes,
appellate courts are discouraged from
reaching the ultimate issue of
76
review.
on
confusion
of
likelihood
In support of the contention that likelihood of confusion should
be dealt with as a fact-driven analysis, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit noted in Williams that it "has refused on many

occasions to decide de novo the facts underlying the trial court's
determination of whether likelihood of confusion existed.",7 By
repeatedly citing78 to this language, Ninth Circuit courts seem to be
asserting that disrupting the weight afforded facts in the likelihood of
confusion analysis disrupts some property of the finding of fact itself.

III. The Significance of Disparate Standards of Review
A party who wishes to appeal the decision of a district court is at
a distinct advantage in circuits where the appellate court can review
both the ultimate conclusion and the weight afforded the various
underlying facts. 79 The Ninth Circuit essentially binds the hands of
appellate judges in cases where one party or another disputes the
facts.80 The court on appeal reviews the lower court's findings of fact
for clear error."s Absent clear error in fact, the appellate court is
instructed by precedent to uphold the decision made by the district
court." To compound the problem, the Williams holding is unclear,
and could easily engender misapplication of the Ninth Circuit's rule
for reviewing likelihood of confusion.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
The court supported this assertion with the following cases: Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 799 (9th Cir. 1970); Paul Sachs Originals Co. v. Sachs, 325
F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1963); Plough, Inc. v. Kreis Labs., 314 F.2d 635, 641 (9th Cir. 1963).
78. See, e.g., Alpha, 616 F.2d at 443.
79. In the Second Circuit, appellate courts review de novo the ultimate conclusion of
law and the weight given to the underlying facts. See, e.g. Plus Products, 722 F.2d at 999.
80. Ninth Circuit precedent, however, directs judges to uphold the rulings of the
district court judge unless the parties stipulate to the facts. See, e.g., Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at
347.
81. See generally id.
82. Alpha, 616 F.2d at443.
83. There is language in the Williams opinion that indicates that even the ultimate
conclusion of law as to likelihood of confusion should sometimes be treated as an issue of
fact. See Williams, 523 F.2d at 190 ("whether... more a question of law or one of fact
depends on the circumstances .... ").
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As a result of the jurisprudential application of the Sleekcraft
standard, appellants are placed in the untenable position of choosing
between disputing facts found by the district, thus sacrificing de novo
review in the event the appellate court does not find those facts
clearly erroneous, and challenging only the conclusion of law,
knowing that the appellate court may well reach the same conclusion
as the district court in the absence of new evidence.'
IV. A Case for De Novo Review
A. The Ninth Circuit's Faulty Rationale
The theory underpinning the Ninth Circuit's standard of review
is fundamentally unsound. Two tenuous rationales support the
circuit's fairly consistent policy of upholding at the appellate level
district court findings on the issue of likelihood of confusion in cases
involving factual dispute. The first of these rationales is that where
the district court did not err with regard to the truth of a finding of
fact, it also afforded appropriate weight to that fact.8 ' The second
flawed rationale is that by reviewing likelihood of confusion de novo,
an appellate court upsets findings of fact which must be reviewed for
clear error.8
Trademark infringement is established in every circuit by
applying a multi-factor balancing test to determine whether there is a
likelihood of confusion.' To the extent that the facts of a case must
not only be found, but also weighed, 88 a substantially human element
is introduced into an otherwise fact-driven process. While findings of
fact are appropriately reviewed for clear error in every circuit,
likelihood of confusion is not fact-driven enough to obfuscate the
need for genuine, plenary review by appellate courts. 89 To the extent
that Ninth Circuit precedent is followed, where no error with respect
to the facts of a case exists, appellate courts are instructed to uphold
the district court's balancing. 90 This removes genuine review of the

84. See supra Part II.D.
85. This rationale is never explicitly given, but follows from Alpha, 616 F.2d at443,
(stating that "to the extent that the conclusion of the trial court is based solely upon
disputed findings of fact, the appellate court must follow the conclusion of the trial court
unless it finds the underlying facts to be clearly erroneous").
86. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 345.
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21.
88. Id.
89. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 347 n.12.
90. Id.
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ultimate legal conclusion from the province of the Circuit Courts,
relegating them instead to the position of nurse-maids policing factfinding for clear error.
The Second Circuit recognizes the value of de novo review of
likelihood of confusion. Plus Products9' and later cases in the Second
Circuit impliedly recognize the value of meaningful review on a
conclusion of law that contains substantial human element and
consistently distinguish between that conclusion of law and its
underlying issues of fact. 92 Plus Products and its progeny permit
Courts of Appeal for the Second Circuit to engage in meaningful
review of the ultimate legal conclusion of likelihood of confusion by
looking to the weight assigned by district court judges to each of the
relevant Polaroidfactors. 9 This process ensures that the function of
appellate courts, review of questions of law, is preserved and
promoted. 9

Perhaps the Ninth Circuit is attempting to make the likelihood of
confusion calculus seem automatic, and therefore more legitimate, by
ignoring the substantially subjective weighing of facts in each case by
a human judge. 9 The reasoning contained in the Williams opinion,
that the court often refuses to review de novo the facts underlying a
likelihood of confusion,' improperly equates an ultimate finding of
likelihood of confusion with the preliminary findings of fact that
buttress it. Findings of fact by a district court are in no way disrupted
by appellate review of whether appropriate weight was afforded each
factor in the likelihood of confusion balancing. De novo review of the
ultimate conclusion of likelihood of confusion, insofar as appellate
courts are required to accept the district court's findings of fact absent
clear error, does not disrupt the function of the lower court or
appreciably add to the burden on the appellate court.

91. Plus Products, 722 F.2d at 1003.
92. For an example of a later case recognizing the value of plenary review, see, e.g.,
Arrow Fastener,59 F.3d at 399-400.
93. Plus Products, 722 F.2d at 1003.
94. Arrow Fastener,59 F.3d at 400 (noting that purposeful application of the Polaroid
factors is helpful to appellate courts "for the performance of their assigned task of
review").
95. Assuming that if a finding of fact is correct, it follows that it was applied
appropriately in a judge's balancing ignores the potentially flawed human element from
the equation.
96. Sleekcrafi, 599 F.2d at 345.
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De Novo Review as Structurally Ideal Because of the Requisite MultiFactor Analysis in the District Court

Circuit Judge Cabranes included a subtle argument for de novo
review of likelihood of confusion in his opinion in Arrow FastenerCo.
v. The Stanley Works.97 Judge Cabranes pointed out that the multifactor approach set out by Judge Friendly in Polaroidrequires district
courts to analyze the Polaroid factors in a careful, consistent
manner.98 If the district court properly applies the multi-factor test,
the appellate body has an ideal body of information from which to
discern whether the lower court's application of law was proper.99
Failure to weigh every factor relevant to the likelihood of consumer
confusion constitutes reversible error.)° Given the district court's
burden to not only analyze, but articulate its rationale for its decisions
in the realm of likelihood of confusion, appellate courts have a
distinct advantage when it comes time to review conclusions of law.0'1
To employ, for a moment, the precise words of Judge Cabranes,
"litigants are entitled to the illumination and guidance [that applying
the Polaroid factors] affords, and appellate courts depend on it for
the performance of their assigned task of review. ' '°
Whether by stipulation or findings of fact by a lower court,
appellate courts always have a set of facts presumed true to work
from. Where facts are in dispute, the burden is on the appellant to
demonstrate clear error by the district court before that presumption
is overcome.103

Even the Ninth Circuit has recognized that in cases where the
facts are stipulated, the appellate court is "in as good a position as the
trial judge to determine the probability of confusion."' ° The
interesting contradiction in the approach of the Ninth Circuit is as
follows: insofar as a district court properly exercises its duty to act as
a finder of pertinent fact, the appellate court is always in as good a
position as the trial judge to determine the probability of confusion.' 5

97. Arrow Fastener,59 F.3d at 400.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Beer Nuts Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 942 (10th Cir.
1983).
101. Arrow Fastener,59 F.3d at 400.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Plus Products, 722 F.2d at 1004-05; Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 347.
104. Williams, 523 F.2d at 190.

105. Where the district court does not properly analyze the relevant facts, the case is
reversed and remanded. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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Courts of appeal are not, of course, well situated to act as finders
of fact. Likelihood of confusion determinations, however, require no
factual findings because the facts are presented to the appellate court
either by the district court or, in some cases, by the parties
themselves. The conclusion of law with respect to likelihood of
confusion does not flow directly from the facts presented, but from a
subjective balancing of those facts.' ° For this reason, even the Ninth
Circuit has recognized that appellate courts are equally situated to
determine likelihood of confusion in cases where the facts are
stipulated; it is unreasonable to presume appellate courts are less
capable of balancing likelihood of confusion when presented with
facts by the lower court rather than the parties. °

V. Broader Policy Application
Just as appellate review within the Ninth Circuit itself was a
jumbled, incoherent morass of contradictory messages, so appears
precedent for standard of review on the issue of likelihood of
confusion on the .national level." s The Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth,
Ninth, and Federal Circuits all deal with likelihood of confusion as a
question of law, at least where the facts are stipulated.'" Other
circuits review likelihood of confusion as a question of fact, or as so
substantially driven by questions of fact as to be indistinguishable
from them. °
Looking at this broad and obvious split in the circuits, Justice
White's dissent to the denial of certiorari in Elby's Big Boy seems
eminently reasonable."' To preserve equitable application of
trademark law across the various circuits, the Supreme Court will
have to address this issue at some point."' Since there are apparently

106. Plus Products,722 F.2d at 1004-05.
107. This presumption must exist in the Ninth Circuit, otherwise Sleekcraft would not
require appellate judges to uphold a district court judge's conclusion of law absent clear
error where facts are disputed.
108. See Alpha, 616 F.2d at 444, as compared to Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 346.
109. See, e.g., Plus Products, 722 F.2d at 1004-05 (2d. Cir. 1983); Kos Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Andrix Corp., 369 F.3d 700 (3d Cir. 2004); Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc. v.
Frisch's Restaurants, Inc., 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1982); Frito Lay, Inc. v. So Good Potato
Chip Co., 540 F.2d 927 (8th Cir. 1976); Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 346 (9th Cir. 1979); Kenner
Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus. Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 352 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
110. To the extent that likelihood of confusion requires both a balancing and a "trip
into the mind" of the average consumer, it does not seem appropriate to deal with it as a
finding of fact.
111. 459 U.S. 916.
112. Id (White, J. dissenting).
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functioning standards of review in each circuit, the need for certiorari
to the Supreme Court may not be pressing, but the application of the
law from jurisdiction to jurisdiction will increase the impetus to
resolve the split over time. The simple fact that turmoil exists within
the individual circuits' 3 is evidence of the obvious need for a final
word on the proper standard of review in likelihood of confusion
cases.
VI. Conclusion
Trademarks are important tools used to efficiently inform
consumers about the source or origin of products in the
marketplace.'14 Infringement on a trademark is demonstrated by a
showing that there is a likelihood that reasonably prudent purchasers
will be confused about the source or origin of a product as a result of
the junior user's actions in marking their own product."5 A showing of
likelihood of confusion requires balancing a substantially similar list
of factors in every circuit; " " since the test for establishing
infringement is the same in each circuit, so too should be the standard
under which the allegation of infringement is reviewed.
Likelihood of confusion is an analysis that is structurally perfect
in design for appellate review. 7 District courts are required to set out
their findings of fact on each factor of the likelihood of confusion test
and explain the relative weight afforded each."8 Failure to set out
findings of fact is reversible error; this procedural safeguard protects
the integrity and completeness of district court opinions on likelihood
of confusion."9 The Second Circuit has appropriately recognized the
value of de novo review in trademark infringement cases.
The Court in Arrow Fastener pointed out that "only when the
Polaroid factors are applied consistently and clearly over time that
the distinctions between different factual configurations can
emerge.' 12' The point here is simple: in order to develop a rich and
clear body of case law in the area of trademark infringement, factors

113.

See Alpha, 616 F.2d at 444, as compared to Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 346.

114. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
COMPETITION, § 12:1, 12-4 (4th ed. 2004).
115. Perini,915 F.2d at 127 (4th Cir. 1990).
116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 (1995).
117. See supra Part IV.B.
118. Id.
119. Arrow Fastener,59 F.2d at 400.
120. Arrow Fastener,59 F.2d at 400.
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need to be applied consistently. It is the function of appellate courts
to ensure that consistency. '
In the Second Circuit, appellate courts engage in plenary review
of likelihood of confusion.122 De novo review on appeal takes
advantage of the onerous analysis required of district courts in these
cases and ensures that likelihood of confusion is applied equitably
throughout the Circuit. Second Circuit decisions evidence none of the
confusion that appears in the Ninth Circuit with respect to
appropriate standard and scope of review."' De novo review is simply
applied and has multifarious benefits. The Polaroid factors should
remain findings of fact,'24 but on the ultimate issue of likelihood of
confusion, de novo review is the proper standard and should be
applied throughout the circuits.

121.

Id.

122.
123.

Plus Products, 722 F.2d at 1004-05.
See Alpha, 616 F.2d at 443, supra note 71.

124.

287 F.2d at 495.

